Tensions abound at the Nogŭnri Peace Park. It is a public memorial, but it originates from one man's testimonial account. It purports to commemorate and restore honor to the victims of the Nogŭnri Massacre, yet it marginalizes those victims in favor of a "truth" whose validation seemingly rests on the perpetrators. It subverts the hegemonic knowledge of American rescue and friendship, even as it follows a common Korean War-as-6/25 narrative absolving South Korean and American responsibility during the Korean War. Finally, it champions a globalized value of peace that, in turn, risks enabling the consumption of Nogŭnri as commodified culture. By looking at the Nogŭnri Peace Park and the narratives, images, and artifacts exhibited there, this article explores the tensions that complicate constructions of history, community, and nation at the site of memorialization. It examines how the Nogŭnri Massacre is recollected and represented alongside the transitional shift from domestic authoritarianism to global neoliberalism in today's South Korea. Further, it investigates the limits of the state critique that the Nogŭnri Peace Park performs.
Massacre was a true incident, and that Nogŭnri is a symbol of peace and human rights (Committee for Nogŭnri Victims 2009, 311-312) . The long struggle for recognition, apology, and compensation validates the park's need to valorize truth. In the face of outright denial by the United States, the veracity of the event needs to be asserted so that what happened at Nogŭnri is not forgotten again. Yet the demand for truth raises the fundamental question of who actually has the authority to define truth. Since the killings were committed by American soldiers alone, the admission of truth seems to rest solely on the United States. This produces the ironic and troublesome effect of positioning the United States as the authority of truth and as the benefactor of apologies and restitution.
The dilemma between needing to assert truth and authorizing the United States to affirm that truth is further complicated by the vexing privatization of commemorative space at the Nogŭnri Peace Park. Framed as a commemoration of Chung Eun-yong and Chung Koo-do's personal quests, this ostensibly commemorative and public space erases other victims and survivors of the massacre. The Chungs' seeming monopoly over Nogŭnri, their freedom from an ethical responsibility to alterity, runs in line with the hegemonic ideology of neoliberal globalization in South Korea today. In the desire to "move beyond Nogŭnri and into the world," there occurs an abrupt jump from remembering the event to marketing and capitalizing on Nogŭnri as a global site for peace and human rights (Yi Sang-ki 2012) .
In problematizing the concession of authority to the United States and the neoliberalization of Nogŭnri, this article questions not only who "owns" the Nogŭnri Peace Park but how this public mnemonic site produces, maintains, mitigates, and contradicts its own (2010, 505) . That is, 6/25 situates the Korean War as an isolated event and not as a "second-order effect produced by Western imperialism" in which the United States came to exercise sovereign power over South Korea by usurping Japan's sovereign power (505-506).
Hence, 6/25 refracts the Korean War through a Manichean prism of good versus evil in which the Americans are "welcome" friends, Communist North Koreans are evil "invaders," and South
Koreans are innocent victims.
Under the authoritarian regimes of Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-Hee, and Chun Doohwan, wartime suffering was exploited to produce and maintain this pro-American and antiNorth Korean world view under the banner of 6/25. Stories of aid from the United States and recurring provocations by North Korea further solidified and strengthened this ideological construction. Buttressed as the state narrative of the Korean War, 6/25 was how the war was studied, remembered, taught, and commemorated (Kim 2009, 4) . Under prohibitive national security laws, any deviation from the 6/25 narrative was deemed unpatriotic-and, more importantly, punishable. Why, then, does the Nogŭnri Peace Memorial reproduce this "myth" produced and perpetuated by the state to police and enforce "anticommunist patriotism" (Suh 2010, 504) ? What does this reveal about the Nogŭnri Massacre, Nogŭnri Peace Park, and South Korea?
In its uncritical rendition of the state-sanctioned 6/25 narrative, the memorial maintains curious silence concerning American and South Korean massacres and atrocities committed during the Korean War-including at Nogŭnri. It is not until the next section of the exhibit, unequivocally titled "Innocence: Innocent Villagers Unaware of War," that Nogŭnri is first mentioned. Here, a video plays on an eternal loop. Grainy black-and-white footage of American soldiers running chaotically dissolve, intermittently, into a bright, colorful papier-mâché diorama of idyllic rural life: two elderly men play paduk (go) perched on the wooden maru (floor), little children gather in cheeky mischief, and buxom women with their head-bundles walk to the fields. The caption reads: "Villagers in Yŏngdong were totally unaware of the war situation.
Despite the sound of occasional gunshots heard, they remained busy with weeding the field, hoping for a good harvest."
In front of this scene stands an unassuming touch-screen kiosk that displays, on command, short, stale images of the Korean War and several brief testimonies. Each testimony, clearly edited for time, begins and ends with an impassioned account of the "unexpected brutal shootings by Americans." Charged with emotion, the survivors speak with grimaces and in highpitched, urgent tones. Astonishingly, this kiosk (one of four interactive screens) is the only space within the memorial dedicated to survivor testimony. Yet the screen remains dark until visitors engage with it, and, as modern technology is apt to do, was experiencing technical difficulties and blacked out during my visit.
Far from plumbing the complexities of how an event like Nogŭnri could have occurred, the Peace Memorial plays up the trope of simple, innocent country folk blissfully unconcerned with politics, ideology, or warfare. By juxtaposing the bleak war footage against the pastoral diorama, the memorial screens the Nogŭnri Massacre through a victim/perpetrator binary whereby the villagers (in this case, the South Koreans) are always already victimized. In this way, the memorial tries to safely enfold the Nogŭnri Massacre into the national tragedy of 6/25.
In the rush to victimize Nogŭnri, however, the memorial ends up contradicting its own historical position. For how can an event like Nogŭnri occur within the pro-American/anti-North Korean 6/25 framework? Moreover, who is the perpetrator here? Without the survivors' testimonies (discreetly contained and often silenced within the touch-screen monitor), there appears to be no plainspoken incrimination of the United States as perpetrator. The memorial simply urges us to a feeling of indignation-at the shattering of innocence-about a national tragedy that began on June 25. Failing to question the why and how of the massacre, the memorial always begins after the event. Focusing solely on Nogŭnri, all the while reiterating the innocence and victimization of South Koreans as a whole, the Peace Memorial conveniently elides South Korea's own perpetration of wartime atrocities. In this sense, the memorial unwittingly colludes with the very state narrative that silenced any talk of Nogŭnri for so long and erases its own presence as a counter-narrative.
In establishing the victims of the Nogŭnri Massacre as simply "victims," the Peace Memorial makes two glaring historical omissions. First, the fall of Taejŏn in the early weeks of the war and the subsequent retreat of U.S. troops and refugees are key to better understanding the Nogŭnri Massacre. It was in Taejŏn that the U.S. Army suffered its biggest and most humiliating defeat, by North Korean soldiers dressed as refugees (Cumings 2010, 167-168) . Rumors soon spread of "Red infiltrators" mixed among the hordes of white pajama-clad refugees fleeing alongside the soldiers. Terrified by guerrilla warfare and fueled by intense, racialized hatred toward the Koreans, the U.S. Army thus sanctioned the "strafing of refugee columns moving down roads toward U.S. units" as they, too, fled southward-toward Nogŭnri (Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza 2001, 74-76) . 6 From the American side, the fear of potential guerrillas hiding in the hills of Yŏngdong was not unwarranted. Here, then, is a possible explanation for why the Peace Memorial reproduces the repressive 6/25 myth. Considering that survivors and bereaved families of Korean War civilian atrocities were "branded as communists" and systematically policed by the South Korean state, the conformity seems a learned and almost natural response to escape further persecution (Kim 2010 ). We would do well to remember that, although the Nogŭnri Special Act was passed under the liberal Roh Moo-hyun administration, the memorial itself was built and organized during the Nogŭnri but "wish for the U.S. to be our undeterred friend in the future," with the hope that "the U.S. will work toward healing our pain and act in genuine good conscience to tell the truth." Evident in the Peace Memorial is a valorization of truth-and, subsequently, a privileging of the United States as the agent to validate that truth as truth. After all, it was the American AP news agency that placed Nogŭnri "on the map"-igniting international and national attention the likes of which have not been granted to any Korean War-related event either before or after Nogŭnri. As previously mentioned, after several years of poring over declassified U.S. military documents, interviewing Korean War veterans and Nogŭnri survivors, and combatting internal delays, the Associated Press voiced a silenced past back into the present. The alarming and horrifying story of "wholesale slaughter" at Nogŭnri made headlines worldwide and forced the U.S. Army to open an investigation into the event (Choe, Hanley, and Mendoza 1999). 8 After fifteen arduous months, U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen announced that, although American troops had killed civilians, specific casualty figures and the existence of orders from the United States could not be definitively confirmed: "U.S. Commanders did not issue oral or written orders to fire on refugees in the vicinity of Nogŭnri" (Hanley 2010, 593) .
9 By affirming participation but gainsaying direct involvement, the investigation turned the massacre at Nogŭnri into an incredible, ghostly event in which "people died, but no one killed" (Yi Hyŏn-su 2013, 68) . Confirming the army's account, then president Clinton issued a carefully worded statement of "regret" in lieu of an official apology acknowledging wrongdoing, a declaration quoted on the memorial's signage:
I deeply regret that Korean civilians lost their lives at Nogŭnri in late July 1950. Although we have been unable to determine precisely the events that occurred, the U.S. and South Korean governments have concluded that an unconfirmed number of innocent Korean refugees were killed or injured there. . . . As we honor the civilians who fell victim to this conflict, let us not forget that pain is not the only legacy of the Korean War. American and Korean veterans fought for the cause of freedom and they prevailed. The vibrancy of democracy in Korea, the strong alliance between our two countries, is a testament to the sacrifices made by both of our nations 50 years ago.
The joint investigation was thus officially closed and effectively buried under liberal democratic notions of "freedom" and "sacrifice." Clinton's statement not only repeats the "triumphalist reading of U.S. military campaigns as a perennial struggle for freedom from tyranny," but, in doing so, recalls the 6/25 narrative in which the United States is a friend who helped South toward the United States for "lacking the will to investigate the truth" and "minimizing the truth." Yet he also claims to find the "gesture" meaningful and alludes to it as "small David's win over giant Goliath" (Chung Koo-do 2014).
In Efforts by the Nogŭnri Survivors' Committee have always revolved around two agendas vis-à-vis the U.S. government: clarification of the truth (chinsangkyumyŏng) and official redress (in the form of an apology and compensation). Truth and compensation work in association because the latter cannot occur without the former. However, depending on the United States to act "in genuine good conscience to tell the truth" is problematic. For example, as legal scholar Hyunah Yang has acutely argued with regard to the issue of comfort women, another painful and sensitive colonial residue, "the colonizer's viewpoint" should not prevail (1997, 56) . In the need for truth, the memorial renders too much agency to the United States by ceding authority (and perhaps even authenticity) of the Nogŭnri Massacre to the Americans. Hence, the survivors become mere evidence of a truth only the United States can prove.
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On the other hand, it seems possible to conceptualize this insistent appeal to the United States as the authority for establishing the truth about Nogŭnri not as a symptom of a neocolonial mentality but as a dogged challenge lashed at the U.S. government to unequivocally acknowledge its guilt. The Peace Memorial is doubly caught between the South Korean and the American states. Seen in this way, the privileging of American sources may offer a way for the "colonized" to safely talk back to the colonizer, in the colonizer's language. Rather than a sign of inferiority, this contradiction may be seen as what exposes the insidious pervasiveness of the state's ideological authority. For those at Nogŭnri, whose social and political statuses have so long been tenuous, the pressure to acquiesce to the nation's dominant self-image must indeed seem pressing.
Privatizing Nogŭnri Memories
Rushed to memorialize but thwarted by the scarcity of artifacts, the Nogŭnri Peace round; it is no wonder that it was not selected. Chung continued to work on his Nogŭnri story, and the inception of a civilian government in 1993 inspired him to publish his manuscript.
However, as the "first book in South Korea to accuse U.S. troops of civilian killings," his book was deemed by publishers as "too controversial" (Chung Koo-do 2010, 58). One lesser-known publisher, Tari, agreed to print the story-but only under the condition that it be categorized as a "novel based on a true story" (Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza 2001, 259 "tragedy of fratricidal war"-evinces the care Chung takes not to explicitly implicate himself, and understandably so. His narrative is written in the third person, often veiled by Christian tones of redemption.
In the fifth chapter, titled "Two-Faced Americans," Chung rightly concedes the narrative to the survivors to describe what he calls the "manhunt" (ingan sanyang) (148). He also addresses his readers directly for the first time: "I will explore the historical background to this tragedy and then relay the stories from the site of the massacre" ( Framed as "stories that my good wife, Pak Sŏn-yong, faithfully told me" (138), the testimonials record the shock, horror, fear, pain, and brutality felt, seen, and experienced by the survivors: Yang Hae-ch'an lost his grandmother and two brothers in the first strafing and was petrified to see his sister Hae-suk's "eyeballs dangling from a wispy thread-like vein"; Chŏng Sin-ung witnessed his old mother crawl out of the tunnel for air only to be killed instantly; Sŏn-yong observed young men barricade the tunnel entrance with the bodies of those who had lived, worked, and eaten together only a few days before; and Nam-il abandoned his newborn baby in an attempt to escape the tunnel (148-152).
The titular two-facedness of the Americans comes from Pak Sŏn-yong's memory. After her daughter, Koo-hi, is shot, she desperately but successfully crawls out of the tunnel with her three-year-old son, Koo-p'il. In the lush ridges, however, they encounter an African American solider resting; against Sŏn-yong's pleas, he shoots at the mother and son. Finding Koo-p'il dead, Sŏn-yong prays to God to take her life. A moment later, two "white soldiers" approach her, tend to her wounds, and transport her to the U.S. military field hospital in Kimch'ŏn. Lying in her cot, Sŏn-yong wonders in disbelief: "Who are these two-faced American soldiers who kill on one side and heal on the other?" (171-175).
Unlike Chung's testimonial novel, which gives voice to Kim Pok-jong, Chŏn Ch'un-ja, Yang Hae-ch'an, and others, the Peace Memorial erases the variegated experiences of those who Koo-do praises his father as a man who "always wanted to make more of himself" and did so by "choosing to go to university in Seoul" (which, in turn, makes his silence about Chung Eunyong's past as a police officer more acutely felt) (Chung Koo-do 2014) . 16 The celebration of Chung Eun-yong's self-made rise is subsequently a celebration of the hard work and sacrifice he made to achieve the creation of the Peace Memorial. These neoliberal values of individual enterprise and perseverance are inscribed at the entrance of the memorial for all to see: "The restoration of human rights is the fruit of sweat and sacrifice of so many people. Peace is given to those who strive to cherish it." But when other survivor testimonies remain hidden, what the memorial seems to celebrate from the outset is the "sweat and sacrifice" not of "so many people" but of Chung Eun-yong and Chung Koo-do. Thus, however much the memorial claims to speak for and commemorate all the victims, the stories of those who actually perished in the twin tunnels are again forgotten.
To be fair, the dead are not entirely absent from the memorial and park. Indeed, citing the change in the memorial park's name from the original Nogŭnri Commemorative Park to the current Nogŭnri Peace Park in 2009, Chung Koo-do added: "We decided to place less emphasis on the dead; we wanted to move forward and make the Nogŭnri Peace Park a symbol of peace" (Chung Koo-do 2014). The desire to bury the dead-and the past-and to move on to a happier and brighter concept of peace resonates throughout the park.
In the memorial, across the wall of names, a delicate butterfly mobile hangs from the ceiling; its flittering shadow is projected onto a wall where a short animated video plays on a loop (figure 5). Drawn in thick, strong brushstrokes, the clip begins with a single white lotus; from the lotus, a woman dressed in a traditional white hanbok arises, dancing gracefully and waving an airy white sheet in each hand. Her dance brings to mind a shaman's kut (exorcism) ritual. Having consoled the dead, the woman disappears; petals dance with the winds as green shrubs spring by the twin tunnels and more butterflies flitter above. Life-peace-has returned to Nogŭnri.
What Peace? Whose Peace?
The Nogŭnri Peace Park and Memorial repeatedly champions itself as a symbol of peace.
However, in the drive to refashion Nogŭnri as more than a site of tragedy-into the face of peace-the park avoids any elaboration of the concept of peace. Here, peace is an empty, abstract concept, devoid of any political or ideological value. It is not an impetus for reconciliation; it is not solemn or dark. Rather, as the animation declares, peace at the Nogŭnri Peace Park is new, bright, vibrant, and joyous.
Nothing more clearly demonstrates the evident desire to mask the memory of the brutal massacre with a peaceful Nogŭnri than the nostalgia-inducing gallery called "Memory-Stirring Gallery" (Ch'uŏkŭi Saenghwal Ch'ŏnsigwan) (figure 7). The oddly named display, situated a few yards from the Peace Memorial, invites visitors to experience a bygone time. An old classroom from the 1970s and 1980s is reproduced, replete with an old-fashioned briquette stove, on which dented nickel-silver lunchboxes are kept warm; hand-painted anti-Communist posters also line the walls. The adjoining rooms recreate an outdated furnace (agung'i), tearoom (tabang), mill (pang'akkan), barbershop (ibalso), and comic book store (manhwabang). At the end of the eight-zone gallery is a venue where visitors can, according to a placard, "experience traditional Korean living." The gallery, Chung Koo-do explained, is "a space for adults to reminisce about the good old days and for children to learn how their parents lived back in the day-for fun" (Chung Koo-do 2014).
A wholly different kind of experience is also made available at the memorial. On the lower level, there is a replica of the kind of machine gun used by the American soldiers at Nogŭnri. The replica points to a narrow passageway titled "Road of Lamentation" (figure 8).
Airy gossamer white sheets hang from the ceiling of the entrance. Facing the passageway, one realizes that the passage is meant to symbolize the tunnel. The sheets flutter about, sheer and Both walls of the passageway are punctured by bullet holes, reminiscent of those peppering the tunnels outside. A railroad track traverses the ceiling; the floor is painted a bloody red and lined, on one side, with fluorescent white plastic skulls and bone fragments. Red and green laser lights flash about to highlight the skeletal remains-and dot the visitors in specks of red and green. The entire experience is, at once, garish and incredible. This Disneyfication (as if the tunnels were a theme park attraction to experience in a minute) of an event that still lives on, as pain, agony, and trauma for so many, simplifies and mocks the actual experience itself. In its aim to educate and let visitors "experience" the event, the "Road of Lamentation" desecrates the very event we wish to remember. It corrupts by way of its fiction.
At the Nogŭnri Peace Park, peace is about waxing nostalgic and having harmless fun.
The "memory-stirring" gallery sends a clear message that is, again, in line with the 6/25 narrative, in which South Korea perseveres in the aftermath of the war to become one of the most affluent nations in the world. It is a triumphant narrative that elides the ways in which such progress was built on the backs of violence, repression, and imperialism-forces that silenced Nogŭnri in the first place-and instead fosters a sense of gratitude for the prosperity we enjoy today. Accordingly, the Nogŭnri Massacre is effectively domesticated and pushed to the periphery. This is complicit with the hegemonic neoliberal culture of twenty-first-century South Korea, a cultural condition in which image dominates substance and everything is commodified (Harvey 2005) . Discussing South Korean culture in the age of global neoliberalism, intellectual and activist Kang Nae-hi argues that the South Korean state's transfer of responsibility onto individual provinces, cities, and villages creates a "push toward competitive entrepreneurial practices," so that "even fresh air, clean water, rural simplicity become commodified and to people who may not be involved in the peace movement." It works toward preventing war and promoting remembrance, historical truth, and reconciliation.
Despite being the "very first in South Korea to join the INMP," the Nogŭnri Peace Park fails to achieve these goals (Chung Koo-do 2014) . By marginalizing the dead and subsuming the tragedy of the Nogŭnri Massacre under the rhetoric of "global" and "international" peace, the park encourages an incessant blanching of the past. Remembering the Nogŭnri Massacre is made palatable so that it can be forgotten in a safe-domesticated-way. Furthermore, the sleek, modern, impeccable appearance of the park combined with an elitist global recognition-first by the AP report and then by the INMP-urges the blind consumption of South Korea's global affluence and, in turn, precipitates amnesia of a past that was so hard-won.
It is a shame that the Nogŭnri Peace Park fails to capture the multilayered voices and nuances of the Nogŭnri Massacre. Perhaps the shortcomings evince the myriad contradictions intrinsic to the Nogŭnri Massacre that cannot and will not be neatly teased out. In many ways, the lionizing of Chung Eun-yong at the Peace Memorial plays out the tensions of an event like
Nogŭnri. As a police officer for South Korea, he fled south in fear of the advancing North Korean People's Army-only to lose his family at the hands of American-not North Koreansoldiers. And yet it is his past as a police officer that allowed him the privileged position from which to safely testify to a counter-hegemonic narrative like that of the Nogŭnri Massacre in postwar South Korea, where to be anti-American means to be pro-North Korean, and vice versa.
How can the park and memorial embody the moral and political dilemma involved in articulating so complicated a past history?
From its replication of the 6/25 narrative to its fostering of peace, the Nogŭnri Peace Park takes care to circumvent politics or ideology. Peace is mobilized to mask the multiple tensions that abound in the Nogŭnri Peace Park. This brings us to the question of what peace can actually attain or resolve through memorial practices. Even when so many South Korean memorials end on the note of peace and human rights, there remains an incommensurate gap between such "ideals" and the present state of South Korea, where peace and rights continue to be violated.
Naturalized into a teleological conclusion in the aftermath of war, the uncritical concepts of "peace" and "human rights" create the danger of reinforcing the dominant ideology and obscuring responsibility for both past atrocities and current social iniquities. In its desire to "move beyond Nogŭnri" and participate in a universal (post-ideological) discourse of peace, the In his "Theses on the Philosophy of History," Walter Benjamin ([1940] 2007) writes that history, as presented in a linear, teleological narrative of progress, reduces and represses alterity.
Yet for Benjamin, effective counterpoints can be articulated by "seiz[ing] hold of a memory that flashes up at a moment of danger" (255). That is, when past events are made urgently relevant to the present, they, in turn, question the hegemonic power over the present. Amid the rise of the discourse of chongbuk chwap'a (pro-North leftist) in South Korea today, the anti-Communism of the authoritarian regimes that silenced Nogŭnri seem not so much a distant past. Dragged into new contexts, the Nogŭnri Peace Park holds itself up to scrutiny and encourages us to critically examine how the past is appropriated and recast in our current surroundings-to our present struggles for social change. 
Seunghei Clara Hong is assistant professor of Asian and Comparative

5
All titles are English translations from the Nogŭnri Peace Memorial. 6
Although the Americans acknowledged that the guerrillas in Yŏngdong were indigenous and had no direction from North Korea, they still considered Yŏngdong "a hotbed of resentment and insurrection" (Cumings 2001, 514 According to Hanley, the U.S. Army's declaration that the killings were "not deliberate" was logically untenable in the context of acknowledged facts in the U.S. Defense Department's Nogŭnri Report: trapped refugees were fired on for days, with no cease-fire orders given; they were subjected to mortar and artillery fire, requiring fire-direction orders from U.S. Army officers; and numerous veterans attested to oral orders to fire on what were known to be women, children, and civilians. Moreover, blanket orders to shoot civilians had spread across the war front. This particular information was withheld from South Korean investigators and therefore excluded from the Nogŭnri Report. 10
There is no denying that the AP report-and the international response it garneredpushed the United States to investigate the Nogŭnri Incident. No U.S. official has made even the gesture of fact-finding concerning U.S. atrocities during the Korean War before or after the Nogŭnri investigation. 11
Hayden White (1992) has taught us that every historical discourse is produced as a story. "Facts," therefore, are always already interpreted, and any given historical event is open to multiple meanings-or truths-and this in no way diminishes the "truth value" of the history narrated. Hence, "truth" should not be the end-all framework. 12
The Nogŭnri Peace Memorial displays the 1977 edition of Han'guk Munhak, in which news of The Abandoned is printed. Unlike Do You Know Our Pain?, not much is known about the novella; Chung Koo-do, too, dismisses it as his father's "first literary attempt." 13 Testimony as the Latin American testimonio speaks back to hegemonic discourses. According to literary critic John Beverley (2004) , testimonio is a nonfiction, populardemocratic form of narrative told in the first person by a narrator who is the protagonist or witness of the events recounted. It acts as an ethical recovery after an experience of exclusion and oppression. 14 According to Chung Eun-yong, a number of Yŏngdong men had fled in fear of being conscripted by the North Korean forces. The few that were captured in the twin tunnels also escaped. This is why a great majority of the Nogŭnri Incident victims are women, children, and the elderly. 15
The Bodo League was a massacre of Communists and suspected sympathizers (many of whom were innocent civilians) that occurred in the immediate outbreak of the Korean War. The massacre was wrongly blamed on the Communists and concealed by the South
